Abstract. Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient? In this paper we construct a model that embodies common characteristics of resource contracts. Using this model, we analyze a large class of real-world resource contracts and find them to be economically inefficient. This inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency inherent in these contracts. There are two possible ways to overcome this time inconsistency. The first is to employ a sufficiently large penalty for early termination of the contract. The second and possibly easier method is to offer an upward sloping conservation payment schedule so far overlooked by resource contracts. Under this payment schedule, the agent's ex-ante and ex-post contract choices coincide, social externalities are fully internalized, and the contractual outcome is economically efficient even in the absence of a penalty for early termination. 
Introduction
Resource conservation contracts are used across the world to partially or fully induce resource users to internalize externalities associated with resource utilization. Consider a brief list of examples.
1 According to the OECD (1997) , between 1993 and 1997, fourteen countries in
Europe paid the equivalent of $11 billion to divert 20 million hectares of agricultural land into land reserve and forestry. The U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) spends approximately $1.5 billion annually to contract 12-15 million hectares (Ferraro and Simpson 2002) . The Forest Conservation Easement Contract, which is a part of the Payment for Environmental Services
Program (PESP) in Costa Rica, pays farmers $42 per acre per year for five years to grow forest products on their land (Malavasi and Kellenberg, 2002) . And finally, Conservation International (2000) is currently leasing a large area of forested land in Guyana to preserve biodiversity.
Are commonly observed resource conservation contracts efficient? In this paper we construct a simple model embodying commonly observed characteristics of resource contracts.
We then use this model to analyze the economic efficiency of what appears to be a large class of real-world resource contracts.
Our model has the following four defining features. 1) The agent 2 is required to adopt a resource conserving technology. For example, this could entail setting land aside, or reducing tillage on existing fields.
2) The contract is for a pre-specified period of time. For example, the CRP requires farmers to put land aside for 10-15 years, and the lease on forested land in Guyana lasts 30 years. 3) Agents receive conservation payments while the conserving technology is 1 Many other resource contracts were discussed at a symposium titled "Direct Payments as an Alternative Approach to Conservation Investment", held at the 16th Annual Meetings of the Society for Conservation Biology, Canterbury, England, July 2002 (http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/special/special.htm). Also see Pagiola et. al. (2004) for other examples. 2 For the rest of the paper we shall call the entity offering the contract a principal (this is usually either a governmental, or a non-governmental agency). The entity accepting the contract is called the agent (this is usually either a private land, or resource owner, or can even be another government).
employed, and are not penalized for exploitative behavior once the contract expires. This feature holds for programs such as the CRP, or PESP. Consequently, the resource contract can prevent the exploitation of a resource only temporarily. Once the contract expires, the agent has the incentive to revert to exploitative behavior in place before payments were made. And finally, 4) the payment schedule associated with the contract can be one of two types. Either the agent receives a constant payment per period for adopting a resource-conserving technology (we call this a technology contract). Or the agent receives a payment depending on the amount of resource conserved (we call this a measured accumulation contract).
3
We find that resource contracts sharing these features are economically inefficient. The inefficiency stems from a time inconsistency 4 associated with a "payment-discount" inherent in these contracts. As the principal cannot penalize actions outside the contract, he discounts conservation payments below actual benefits associated with conservation.
5
This paymentdiscount accounts for the external costs of resource exploitation after the contract expires.
Because the contract payment, and consequently, the payment discount are pre-determined before the contract is implemented, we find that the agent's incentives before, and during the contract differ. Before the contract is implemented, the agent prefers a contract with the efficient length of time. However, once in a contract with the efficient length of time, she has the incentive to exit the contract early (as the payment discount can no longer be adjusted for early 3 The contracts listed in the first paragraph are examples of technology contracts. Examples of measured accumulation contracts include the Sustainable Forest Management Contract (a declining payment contract within PESP), and various forms of debt-for-nature-swaps, which are managed by The Nature Conservancy (see their website for details). Technology contracts and measured accumulation contracts are currently being developed to induce farmers to accumulate soil carbon in an attempt to offset greenhouse gas emissions (Feng et. al. 2002 , Antle et. al. 2003 . 4 Kydland and Prescott (1977) introduced time inconsistency to economics. While, their original exposition involved monetary policy, time inconsistency naturally applies to several issues involving dynamic interactions. 5 Please see Feng et al. (2002) , and Chomitz and Lecocq (2003) for a discussion of how the price of sink-based carbon in a tradeable permit system should be discounted relative to the price of carbon associated with permanent greenhouse gas reductions. abandonment) and make an even higher profit than the ex-ante efficient contract promises. The principal recognizes this incentive, and if the agent cannot credibly commit to stay in the contract for the efficient length of time, the contract that emerges from their interactions is shorter than the efficient contract. This inefficiency persists irrespective of whether a technology or measured accumulation contract is employed.
We also analyze the relative efficiency of the technology and measured accumulation contract. Contrary to results in recent literature (e.g., Antle et al. 2003 , Ferarro and Kiss 2002 , Ferraro and Simpson 2002 , we find that a technology contract is more efficient than a measured accumulation contract. Technology payments are often criticized because marginal payments do not coincide with marginal resource accumulation. However, in the presence of time inconsistency, technology payments offset some of the agent's incentive to abandon the contract early. In a measured accumulation contract, payments decline along the length of the contract. This is because most renewable resources (such as soil carbon) accumulate at a decreasing rate as they approach their steady state. In a technology contract, payments are equally distributed across the entire contract. This difference implies that the marginal benefit of being in a technology contract declines slower than in a measured accumulation contract, and the agent stays in the contract for longer.
As mentioned earlier, the time inconsistency derives from the agent's inability to commit to the efficient contract. A potential commitment device is a cost incurred by the agent for early abandonment of the contract (for example, a penalty imposed by the principal). We investigate the effects of costly abandonment in the context of the two types of contracts discussed above.
We find that the minimum cost of abandonment required to restore efficiency in the technology contract is smaller than the measured accumulation contract. This is consistent with fact that greater inefficiency is associated with a measured accumulation contract.
Finally, we present a conservation payment scheme that overcomes time inconsistency even in the absence of costly abandonment. The payments in this scheme are not related to technology adopted, or resource conserved. Payments are equal to the social marginal benefit of an additional unit of time in the contract. In direct contrast to technology, or measured accumulation contracts, these payments increase over time. Further, on receiving these payments the agent's ex-ante and ex-post contract term choices coincide.
The intuition behind the increasing marginal payment scheme is simple. In the case of a temporary resource contract where the required technology is imposed and exogenous, the agent's real choice variable is time spent in the contract (or equivalently the time she abstains from exploitative behavior). This implies that payments in the proposed scheme equal the social marginal benefit of the agent's choice variable. Consequently, these payments help the agent to internalize the payment-discount consequences of early abandonment, and overcome the problem of time inconsistency. This is not possible if payments are linked to exogenous variables like technology, or the amount of resource accumulated.
6
The main contribution of this paper is in recognizing a previously ignored commitment aspect of resource conservation contracts. Most conservation contracts have discounted and predetermined payment schedules extending over several periods of time. This implies that issues of commitment are central to their implementation. On recognizing these issues, the time inconsistency inherent in commonly observed temporary resource conservation contracts becomes apparent. Another contribution is that this paper presents an intuitive payment schedule 6 Note that the lesson learnt from this result is quite intuitive: in order to design efficient resource contracts the principal should link payments to the agent's choice variable and not to other exogenous variables in the contract.
that overcomes this problem of time inconsistency even in the absence of penalties.
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The rest of the paper is structured as following. In Section 2 we present the basic contracting model. In Section 3 we discuss the optimal time in a first-best contract, and compare this with the time spent in a technology, or a measured accumulation contract. We also discuss the role of cost of abandonment as a commitment device. In Section 4 we present a modified conservation payment that overcomes time inconsistency, and we conclude in Section 5.
Model
The agent can choose one of two technologies. 
We assume that b a ρ > > ( ρ is the common discount rate). The growth and decline of the resource is illustrated in Figure 1 . 
R(t)
Technology A Technology B
(where k > 0 is a fixed parameter). This captures the fact that the agent's returns from exploitative behavior are typically related to the stock of the resource, for example, crop yields are relatively high when land is rich in organic matter. We assume that b a π π > to ensure that profits from using technology B are higher than profits from technology A for all ( ) 0 R t ≥ .
Consider the agent's decision regarding use of technology A in the absence of a contract.
As indicated earlier, T denotes time the agent spent in technology A prior to permanently switching to technology B. The agent's objective is to choose T to maximize the present value of profits subject to the resource growth equation:
Integrating and using equation (1) to substitute for R(t) we get
and
Equation (4) can be rearranged to illustrate the instantaneous marginal benefit and cost from remaining in technology A at time T.
The instantaneous marginal benefit is, 
In addition to foregoing constant profit b π , the agent also forgoes the discounted stream of profits associated with exploiting the excess resource. This discounted stream of profits increases over time as the resource stock increases.
To ensure that technology A is never chosen in the absence of a contract (this ensures that 
This restriction is illustrated in Figure 2 . If the inequality in equation (7) does not hold, it becomes optimal for the agent to build up the resource by employing technology A, and earn relatively low short-run profits. The agent later employs the relatively profitable technology B and reaps the benefits from exploiting the accumulated resource. The agent receives continuous payments for the time in the contract. Further, the principal cannot link these payments to any actions taken by the agent after the contractual period. The contractual payment at date t is denoted w(t):
When 0 α = , the contract specifies a "technology payment" because the agent receives a constant payment over time for employing technology A. When a α = , the contract specifies a "measured accumulation payment" because the instantaneous payment is equal to the actual value of resource accumulated less a constant discount factor. As we shall see below, this constant discount factor captures the social loss from resource de-accumulation on expiration of the contract. 
MB & MC
The principal correctly anticipates that once the contract expires, the agent switches from technology A to B and exploits the excess resource conserved. Using equation (1) 
which can be reduced to,
Throughout this paper, we assume that the principal pays the agent the discounted social value of resource accumulated and de-accumulated. Formally, this implies
Using equations (8) and (10), and integrating, we obtain the relevant expression for the intercept term of the payment schedule -( )
If the agent agrees to a contract of length T, the principal pays according to equations (8) 
The Optimal Time in a Contract
We now examine the equilibrium length of the resource contract. We present both the first best outcome and the actual outcome of the technology and measured accumulation contracts.
The Efficient (First-Best) Outcome: The efficient outcome is achieved when the agent fully internalizes the social value of her actions. One way to induce internalization is to pay the agent the social value of resource accumulated with technology A, and charge for the social value of the resource de-accumulated with technology B. This first-best (or complete) contract maximizes the sum of profits, and the social value of resource accumulation and deaccumulation. Further, as the principal pays the entire social value to the agent, this contract also maximizes the agent's post-contract private returns.
Under the first-best contract, the agent's maximization problem is
where the superscript F denotes first-best. Let T * denote the first best-length of the contract. As the right hand side of equation (12) equals the sum of equations (3) and (10) it can be shown that
We can solve for T by setting equation (13) to zero to get:
9 To ensure that T * is positive,
is necessary. This restriction is consistent with equation (7), which ensures that technology A is not chosen in the absence of a contract.
As we did earlier, we can also rearrange equation (13) [ ]
The marginal benefit from equation (15) can also be re-expressed as:
A comparison of equations (5) and (16) reveals an expected result, the first-best contract shifts the agent's marginal benefit schedule upward. Now consider the marginal cost of staying in the first-best contract:
In terms of marginal cost, equations (6) and (17) show that because the agent is penalized for resource exploited, profit earned by using technology B at date T is relatively lower under the first-best contract. Assuming that k bp > , equation (17) Time Inconsistency: In this section we evaluate the efficiency of the technology, and the measured accumulation contract relative to the first-best. We assume that the agent is free to abandon the contract prior to the scheduled termination date at no cost. Later in the paper, we
show that the results of this section also hold if early abandonment is costly, as long as it is not excessively costly.
The principal offers a contract which requires the agent to adopt technology A until date T, in exchange for a pre-specified payment. Once the contract is signed, the agent takes the prespecified payments as given, and thus from the agent's perspective, the payment schedule is: 
MB & MC
The agent takes this payment schedule as given, and then optimizes her time in the contract. In a rational equilibrium, the principal recognizes the agent's ex-post optimization. As a consequence, the principal offers a contract for the optimal ex-post period of time for the agent.
This implies that the value of ( ) C θ α is given by equation (11) with the agent's ex-post optimal choice of T substituted in.
The agent's objective function under the contract is
V T w t e dt kR t e dt
ρ ρ π π
Using equations (1) and (8) to substitute for R(t) and w(t) (with ( , ) ( ) 
The first-order condition for the maximization of equation (19) can be written as 
Unlike the first-best case, a closed form for the optimal time in the contract does not exist.
Nevertheless, by expressing equation (20) 
Given the earlier assumption that a ρ > , the third term of the MB schedule is negative for all 0 T > .
11 On comparing equations (15) and (21), this implies that for all positive and finite T, the marginal benefit of being in the measured accumulation contract is lower than the marginal benefit of being in the first-best contract. Correspondingly the marginal cost of staying in either the measured accumulation, or technology contract is the same as that under no contract (given by equation (6)). This is because the agent cannot be charged for actions taken once the contract expires. As discussed earlier while comparing equations (6) and (17) 
As explained earlier, the last bracketed term of the MB schedule is negative for all 0 T > .
Further, given that b>a, we know that 0
In other words, like the measured accumulation contract, the marginal benefit of staying in the technology contract is lower than the marginal benefit of being in the first-best contract.
Compared to the first-best contract, the downward shift in the marginal benefit schedule and the upward shift in the marginal cost schedule for both contracts implies that the equilibrium length of either resource contract is sub-optimally low. We illustrate this in Figure 4 .
11 This expression can be signed negative if On comparing equations (15) with (21) and (22) we can see that all MB curves coincide as T → ∞ , and that for any given positive and finite T, the following relation holds true:
Further, as negative payments in contracts are not possible, all MB curves also coincide when 0 T = . We also know that for all positive T,
and that the MC curves coincide when 0 T = . This implies that
This result is illustrated in Figure 4 , and is also stated below.
Proposition 1. Assume that the agent can costlessly abandon the contract prior to the specified termination date. The equilibrium length of time spent by the agent in either the technology or the measured accumulation contract is shorter than the ex-ante efficient length of time.
Proof: Follows from Figure 4 and the corresponding discussion. ■ Ex-ante (i.e., before the payments are predetermined) the agent would prefer a contract for the efficient amount of time (T * ). However, once in the contract, payments are predetermined, and T * is no longer optimal. Note that as T * maximizes the agent's profits, and
is strictly concave, Proposition 1 also implies that agent welfare under either contract is suboptimal. This inefficiency is the result of time inconsistency. As the agent cannot credibly commit to stay in the contract for the ex-ante efficient length of time, the equilibrium amount of time spent in either contract is less than optimal.
If the principal naively offers the agent payments based on the ex-ante efficient time, the agent has the incentive to quit early and earn even higher profits than the first-best contract promises. This occurs as contract payments include a discount for resource exploited in the postcontract phase and, this discount is a decreasing function of time in the contract T. The agent realizes that once payments have been pre-determined, there is no mechanism to raise the price discount retroactively for time not spent in the contract. This provides the agent an incentive to cheat on the ex-ante agreed terms by quitting early. This gives the agent the benefit of a lower discount, and higher ex-post profits. However, in equilibrium, the principal recognizes the early abandonment implies that the agent cannot credibly commit to stay in the contract for the efficient length of time. In this section we show that the time inconsistent outcomes implied by Propositions 1, and 2, can emerge even if early abandonment is costly, but not excessively costly. 13 We graphically illustrate the threshold cost of abandonment for either type of contract.
If the actual cost is less than or equal to this threshold, the results stated in Propositions 1, and 2 are valid. If the cost is higher than these thresholds, the agent can credibly commit to stay in the contract for the ex-ante efficient length and efficiency is restored.
Assume that the principal offers the agent payments based on the efficient time of exit Similarly,
MA
C is the threshold associated with the measured accumulation contract. We illustrate these thresholds with the aid of Figure 5 . 13 This cost of abandonment could be a sum of penalties, legal fees, and loss in reputation. 14 In other words, the discount is calculated under the assumption that the agent will exit at the efficient time: 
On comparing equations (15) and (24) we can see that the marginal benefit of staying in this contract is higher than the marginal benefit of staying in the efficient or complete contract. As explained earlier, the marginal cost of staying in this contract is the same as that under no contract. In other words, the marginal cost of staying in the efficient non-linear contract is higher than under the efficient contract. The efficient non-linear payment schedule is illustrated in Figure 4 . The marginal benefit of staying in this contract is denoted MB * , and it intersects the marginal cost of staying in the contract MC * (which is the same as the marginal cost under the technology, or measured accumulation contract) at the optimal time T * .
Conclusions
Through this paper we illustrate a time inconsistency inherent in most resource contracts. We also discuss two potential ways to overcome time inconsistency. The first is to create credible commitment through a cost of abandonment. The second is to present the agent with an efficient upward sloping payment schedule that encourages her to internalize externalities associated with early abandonment.
While a comparison of the relative efficiency of these two methods to overcome time inconsistency is out of the scope of the paper, an informal discussion at this point might be useful. Resource contracts can include an explicit penalty for abandonment. However, for political or other reasons these penalties may be problematic to implement and costly to enforce.
More importantly, if the size of penalty is not as high as the threshold discussed earlier, the contract remains inefficient. On the other hand, adjusting payments to reflect the efficient payment schedule is likely to be an easier and less costly means to overcome time inconsistency.
The potential practical issue might be implementing the complicated non-linear upward sloping schedule required for efficiency. However, a linear upward sloping payment schedule that approximates the efficient payment schedule is likely to be a significant improvement. This will encourage the agent stay in the contract for a longer and more efficient length of time under constant or declining payments.
The upward sloping efficient schedule highlights the fact that temporary resource contracts are inherently different from permanent resource contracts. If the resource is permanently conserved, a payment scheme that links payments to the amount of resource conserved is efficient. However, this is not true if the resource is conserved only for brief period of time. In such a case, payments should be linked to the length of time the owner abstains from exploitation. Linking the payments to the technology adopted, or the amount of resource conserved can lead to an inefficient amount of time allocated to resource conservation. This clarification is increasingly important given that conservation contracts are being proposed as a means to preserve resources worldwide.
